Caracas provided the latest battlefield for PRC and Russian information operations
What happened: The 28 July elections in Venezuela marked the most recent chapter in the South American nation’s deterioration from a functional if imperfect democracy to authoritarianism under the banner of chavismo, the leftist-populist movement begun under former President Hugo Chávez. Results from the National Electoral Council (CNE) touted ruling chavista leader Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013, as the winner with around 52% of the vote. These same results asserted that opposition candidate Edmundo González had received only 43% of the vote, despite pre-election opinion polling indicating a blowout opposition win.
The opposition, likely having expected some degree of foul play, began the arduous task of collecting backup paper copies of precinct vote tallies, ultimately amassing over 80% of these tallies that indicated that González had indeed won the election with around 67% of the vote—a number in line with opinion polling. The US government has since rejected the CNE’s results, recognizing González as the winner.
Western media coverage of voting irregularities and the protests following Maduro’s claimed win was robust, yet Western outlets were not the only ones reporting on Venezuela’s drama. In particular, Chinese- and Russian-affiliated accounts on social media were spinning their own narratives on the election results. These narratives reflected Beijing’s and Moscow’s perceived national interests in keeping a key anti-US actor in power in Latin America and thereby raising operating costs for the US in the region. A comparison of these two powers’ information operations (IO) related to Venezuela’s elections illuminates the ways in which their interests converge and diverge.
What we did: At Two Six Technologies’ Media Manipulation Monitor (M3), we track hundreds of social media accounts affiliated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. These accounts range from embassies to diplomats to state media outlets and journalists, providing a holistic view of how the PRC and the Kremlin attempt to shape the international information environment around them.
What we found: In examining PRC- and Kremlin-affiliated posts on the X (formerly Twitter) platform related to the Venezuelan elections, we found that:
- PRC-affiliated accounts produced at least 500 posts from 28 July–4 August (the first week following the elections), and Kremlin-affiliated accounts were more prolific with at least 1,149 posts during this same period.
- However, even more striking than post volume were engagement numbers: PRC-affiliated posts on the elections had garnered 10,603 retweets, likes, and replies as of 12 August. That number was an astronomically higher 666,562 engagements for Kremlin-affiliated posts on the elections.
These statistics point to a recurring pattern M3 has observed with respect to PRC and Kremlin operations in the information environment: The Kremlin frequently has an edge in post volume and nearly always has an edge in netizen reception. The PRC often struggles to find an audience for its posts, perhaps reflecting its status as a relatively new player in the global information environment. The Kremlin, with decades in the game—including its Cold War heydays—exhibits a particular savviness in reaching target audiences, seen in the success of Kremlin-backed outlets such as Russia Today (RT) that are part of the mainstream media landscape in Latin America.
PRC- and Kremlin-affiliated accounts produced their highest volume of posts on the elections within the first 72 hours of the vote, and M3 conducted a deep dive into post volume during this time period. This deep dive revealed similarities and differences in their IO strategies.
Where Beijing and Moscow converged:
- Both powers covered the elections with heavy interest, given the geopolitical ramifications. Election coverage drove the highest single-day spike (294 posts) in Venezuela-related messaging from Kremlin accounts in a year and the second-highest single-day spike (138 posts) in Venezuela-related messaging from PRC accounts in a year.
- The only event that drove a higher spike (192 posts) in Venezuela-related messaging from PRC accounts was Maduro’s visit to the PRC in September 2023.
- Both powers glossed over voting irregularities and intimidation tactics favoring the Maduro regime that Western media documented well in their coverage of the vote. Approximately 12% of Kremlin-affiliated posts and 4% of PRC-affiliated posts covered voters going to the polls. M3 detected no posts noting irregularities favoring the government, such as reports that opposition monitors were barred from accessing certain polling locations.
- A subset of Kremlin-affiliated posts went so far as to claim the opposite—that the opposition was attempting to force the closure of voting centers where Maduro was supposedly leading.
- Both powers were particularly quick in their recognition of Maduro’s alleged win. Beijing’s and Moscow’s backing added oomph aimed at legitimizing Maduro’s win, even as regional heavyweights such as Brazil and Colombia were more circumspect and asked for the release of individual precinct counts before making any call.
- Chinese response: The first congratulatory post from a PRC-affiliated account occurred only 17 minutes after PRC state media began reporting the CNE’s announced results. PRC accounts began amplifying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official congratulations three hours later.
- Russian response: Similarly, the first Kremlin-affiliated post congratulating Venezuela on its election results occurred a little less than one hour after Kremlin accounts amplified news of the CNE’s vote count. Accounts began amplifying Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s congratulations around four hours after this point.
- Both powers favored the Maduro regime’s narrative that protests following Maduro’s claimed win were “riots” meant to “destabilize” the country. Coverage of ensuing protests made up approximately 22% of PRC-affiliated post volume and 12% of Kremlin-affiliated post volume. This coverage gave far more airtime—almost exclusive airtime, in the case of Kremlin-affiliated posts—to the Maduro regime’s framing of unrest as rioters discontented with a Maduro win instead of with alleged electoral fraud.
A Russian state media–affiliated journalist amplified claims that the opposition pushed for violence and extra-constitutional regime change.
Where Beijing and Moscow diverged:
- Beijing’s messaging, though ultimately helpful to Maduro, was much more risk averse than Moscow’s. Time and again we saw Beijing flip-flop between matter-of-fact reporting and political spin designed to legitimize Maduro’s win. Moscow, by contrast, was almost gleefully aggressive in its commitment to backing Maduro’s narrative at every step of the way.
- PRC-accounts employed spin at around half of the rate of Kremlin accounts. Only 26% of PRC-affiliated posts had some element of narrative spin to them, either in support of Maduro or in an attempt to discredit the Venezuelan opposition or third-party actors such as the US and its allies.
- By contrast, approximately 52% of Moscow’s posts exhibited a similar bias.
PRC accounts, including state media outlets such as CGTN above, relied more on factual reporting—often in “breaking news” style—in their coverage of the Venezuelan elections.
- Kremlin accounts were much more likely to play up accusations of foreign interference against Maduro and to refute the opposition’s claims. PRC accounts were guilty of these actions to a limited extent, as well, but approximately half (46%) of all posts from Kremlin accounts amplified accusations of US interference or dismissed opposition accusations of fraud. Again, accounts were often able to achieve this merely by giving more airtime to actors in the Maduro regime than to opposition voices.
Takeaways: Beijing and Moscow both acted in their own perceived national interests in upholding the almost certainly fraudulent win of Latin America’s most well-known ruling authoritarian leader. However, Beijing was much more cautious in doing so, since its election coverage relied more than Moscow’s on standard news reporting. The reasons for this dynamic are unclear. It could be that PRC state media journalists have a greater interest in reporting the news “as is” and perhaps catching a greater market share of the international news environment. This dynamic would dovetail with M3’s finding that China has prioritized neutral news coverage in 2024 as it seeks to cement itself as a reliable and respectable international news source. Or it could be that unlike Beijing, Moscow is emboldened by its advantage of having multiple decades of experience in international IO strategies. Regardless, both parties ultimately achieved their goal of the continuance of an autocratic regime sensitive to their interests and hostile to Washington’s.
Bridging the gap between the impossible and the practical with innovative technology solutions in cyber, data science, mobile, microelectronics and information operations and a full spectrum of products and capabilities to advance national security missions.